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WORDS AND SENTENCES: PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR
HATE CRIMES'
Shirley S. Abrahamson,2 Susan Craighead3 and Daniel N.
Abrahamson4
Every speech writer yearns for the perfect turn of phrase, the
clever pun, the fresh metaphor, the telling double-entendre. I thought
for sure I had hit upon one when a former law clerk, known in
my chambers as my "Title Man," came up with the phrase "Words
and Sentences" for this speech about penalty enhancements for hate
crimes. According to my original plan, I would tell you about the
words spoken by a young Wisconsin man named Todd Mitchell and
the sentence those words earned him under the state's penalty en-
hancement statute.' Mitchell's words doubled his prison term because
he chose his victim on the basis of race.
But as I started to fill in the pages beneath the title, its mul-
tiplicity of meanings occurred to me. Todd Mitchell's words, his
1. This article is an edited, annotated, and slightly expanded version of the
Ben J. Altheimer Lecture delivered by Justice Abrahamson at the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law on November 5, 1993.
The authors wish to thank Susan M. Fieber for her assistance in editing the
manuscript and preparing it for publication; Wisconsin State Law Librarian Marcia
Koslov and the library staff for their assistance and patience; and the University
of Iowa College of Law faculty for their helpful discussion of a draft of this essay
presented at a faculty colloquium on February 25, 1994. This essay will be presented
to the Madison (Wisconsin) Literary Society in November 1994.
2. Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court. B.A.; New York University 1953; J.D.
Indiana University 1956; S.J.D. University of Wisconsin 1962.
The article speaks in the first person, referring to Justice Abrahamson, as did
the speech. Susan Craighead and Daniel N. Abrahamson join her as authors of
this article in recognition of their significant efforts in developing this topic and
in the writing and editing of the article.
3. B.A. Princeton University 1986; M. Phil. Oxford University 1988; J.D.
Harvard Law School 1993. Law Clerk to Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Supreme
Court of Wisconsin (1993-94). Ms. Craighead is presently a staff attorney at the
Seattle Public Defender Association, Seattle, Washington.4. B.A. Yale University 1986; M.A. Oxford University 1988; J.D. New York
University 1991. Law Clerk to Chief Judge Gilbert Merritt, United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Nashville, Tennessee (1991-92); Law Clerk to
Judge William Dwyer, United States District Court for the Western District of
Seattle, Washington (1992-93). Mr. Abrahamson is presently a staff attorney at
the California Appellate Project, San Francisco, California.
5. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
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prosecution, and his sentence began a new chapter in the evolving
story of the First Amendment and hate crimes. 6
This chapter opened one night with an assault in the small,
rust belt city of Kenosha, Wisconsin and closed with an opinion
written by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
No doubt subsequent chapters are unfolding even as we speak,
perhaps right here in Arkansas.
My own contribution to this chapter of First Amendment law
will probably not merit even a footnote in a law review article. But
each time I re-read my opinion, I am reminded of the tortuous
process of finding the words to express my conclusions. I recall the
discussions in the conference room and, yes, the arguments that
took place in my chambers, as I deliberated on Todd Mitchell's
challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence. And so, I come
here today to tell you about Mitchell's words and his sentence. But
I also want to tell you about my words and sentences, about how
I and other judges deal with cases that are agonizing to us, and
about what our words and sentences reveal about the law and judicial
decision-making.
Let's go back to the beginning, to the Renault apartment complex
in Kenosha, Wisconsin. 7 Gregory Riddick, a fourteen-year-old white
male, was walking by the complex where some young male African
Americans, including Todd Mitchell, were gathered. Without pro-
vocation, about ten members of the group ran across the street
towards Riddick, knocked him to the ground, beat him severely,
and stole his British Knights sneakers. The police found Riddick
6. Before Mitchell, many academic writings about hate speech focused on hate
speech on college campuses and on university codes subjecting students to discipline
if they engaged in hate speech. See, e.g., Charles R..Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Frank
Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for
the ACLU, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 339 (1992); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking
First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 171 (1990); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?, 1990 DuKE L.J. 484; James Weinstein, A Constitutional Road-
map to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REv. 163 (1991).
For discussions of racist speech and critical race theory, see Richard Delgado,
Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling,
17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989);
Henry L. Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil
Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37.
7. The facts are taken from the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), and the briefs filed in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and the United States Supreme Court.
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unconscious a short time later. He suffered extensive physical injuries,
spent four days in a coma, and may have sustained permanent brain
damage.
According to witnesses, sometime before the assault the group
of attackers had been discussing the movie "Mississippi Burning."
Specifically, they had talked about a scene in which a white man
came upon a young African American child at prayer and beat the
child severely.
Before Gregory Riddick appeared, Todd Mitchell, then nineteen
and one of the older members of the group, reportedly asked the
others: "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people?"
Seeing Riddick approach a short time later, he told the group,
"There goes a white boy; go get him." Although he then counted
to three and pointed to indicate that the group should surround
Riddick, Mitchell apparently did not join the attack. Mitchell was
charged with aggravated battery and theft. He was the only adult
charged and tried; his co-actors were juveniles. Mitchell testified that
he had not been part of the movie discussion and that his statement
was not intended to provoke the beating. In December 1990, a jury
found him guilty of battery8 and theft, 9 and party to a crime.' 0 The
jury also returned a separate verdict under the penalty enhancement
statute finding that Mitchell had intentionally selected Riddick as a
victim because of his race."
Under the penalty enhancement statute, a Wisconsin judge is
authorized to increase the penalty for any crime in the state criminal
code if the perpetrator "intentionally selects" the victim "because
8. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.19 (West 1982). Mitchell was found guilty of violating
§ 940.19(lm), a class E felony.
9. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.20(1)(a), (3)(d)(2) (West 1982).
10. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1982).
11. The jury rendered a special verdict that the prosecution had proved beyond
a reasonable doubt the "intentional selection" of the crime victim "because of"
the status of the victim. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809.
Some would argue that a defendant's bigoted statement does not necessarily
prove racial motivation beyond a reasonable doubt. Mitchell, according to one
commentator, has ambiguous facts:
It appears quite possible from the facts that the victim was, in fact, chosen
because of his race. On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that he
was actually chosen because he had nice shoes, or because the group felt
like beating someone and he was an easy target, and the racial remarks
were only incidental.
Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 259, 269 (1992).
Mitchell did not challenge the jury findings on appeal; he attacked only the
constitutionality of the statute. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809-10.
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of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin or ancestry" of the victim.' 2 The statute creates no new crime;
it simply increases the possible penalty for an existing offense.
Mitchell's battery conviction carried a maximum sentence of two
years, but because the jury found that Mitchell had selected Riddick
on the basis of the victim's race, the trial judge had the option of
increasing the maximum period of imprisonment by up to five years.
12. The "hate crime" statute originally provided as follows:
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par.
(a) is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise
affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person
or the owner or occupant of that property.
(2)(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor
other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000
and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county
jail.
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A
misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status
of the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and
the revised maximum period of imprisonment is 2 years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum
fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than
$5,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for
the crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable
for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find
a special verdict as to all the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required
for a conviction for that crime.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West Supp 1993-94).
The statute was amended after Mitchell's offense to read in relevant part as
follows:
(l)(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under
par. (a) is committed or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise
affected by the crime under par. (a) in whole or in part because of the
actor's belief or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability,
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or the owner
or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception
was correct. ...
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry or proof
of any person's perception or belief regarding another's race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required
for a conviction for that crime.
Act 291 of 1991, §§ 1, 2 (codified as amended at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.645(l)(b),
(4) (West Supp. f993-94)) (emphasis added to show changes).
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The trial court chose to double Mitchell's sentence to four years. 3
Mitchell appealed.' 4 He focused his appeal on the constitution-
ality of the Wisconsin hate crimes statute under the First Amendment
to the federal constitution.
As far as I can tell, the Mitchell case was the first prosecution
under Wisconsin's hate crime law." One can only speculate about
why the Kenosha County prosecutor chose to seek the enhanced
penalty. If his goal was to have Mitchell incarcerated for a long
time, other means were available. The prosecutor could have asked
for the maximum sentence on battery and a consecutive prison
sentence on the theft charge, arguing that the defendant's words
evidencing racial hatred would warrant imposing sentences at the
maximum range.' 6
Instead, the prosecutor chose the riskier course. Perhaps he
sought the enhanced penalty deliberately to raise the constitutional
issue and test the law. As Chief Judge Abner Mikva of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has written, lawyers
13. The trial court further stayed a four-year sentence for the theft and imposed
a four-year period of consecutive probation for the theft conviction. Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d at 809.
14. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held the statute constitutional. State v.
Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
15. As of 1990, Milwaukee, the largest community in the state, had not pros-
ecuted anyone under the statute. The Milwaukee County deputy district attorney
was quoted as stating that his office "just hasn't had many cases where the heavier
penalties could have been charged." CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH,
Penalties for Crimes Motivated by Bigotry or Bias Followup, Mar. 7, 1990, at 4.
There have been few criminal convictions or civil actions under hate crime laws
across the country. Hate crimes are difficult to detect and to prove. See Marc L.
Fleischauer, Teeth for a Paper Tiger: A Proposal to Add Enforceability to Florida's
Hate Crimes Act, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 697, 701 (1990); James Morsch, Comment,
The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument Against Presumptions of
Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659, 664 (1991).
16. Wisconsin precedent supported a trial court's consideration of hate speech
in sentencing. The state might have relied on State v. J.E.B., 469 N.W.2d 192
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991). In J.E.B. the defendant sexually molested his own children.
The defendant also possessed books describing sexual acts between adults and
children. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court could
consider the defendant's presumptively protected reading materials in imposing the
sentence if there was a reliable showing of a sufficient relationship between the
protected use of the books and the assaults committed by the defendant. See
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) (concluding that introduction at penalty
phase of capital case that defendant was a member of a racist organization violated
the First Amendment where offense had nothing to do with defendant's racist
beliefs). A defendant's motive for committing a crime has traditionally played a
part in sentencing while a defendant's abstract beliefs have not. Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199-200 (1993).
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
and judges have an "uncontrollable itch . . . to be involved in and
decide seminal constitutional issues .... And so that nice, com-
fortable law-school precept to avoid constitutional questions if at
all possible has become as obsolete as the Rule in Shelley's case.' ' 7
More important and interesting than the decision to prosecute
under this statute were the reasons for its adoption. Despite the
many criminal laws proscribing conduct such as Mitchell's, legislators
have in recent years felt a need to pass laws specifically aimed at
conduct motivated by hatred of the victim's race, religion, or other
characteristics.
During the mid-1980s, the media in many states, and indeed in
many countries, were reporting increased incidents of so-called hate
crime, bias-motivated crime, ethnic intimidation, or ethnoviolence. 8
Hate crimes were making the news in Wisconsin too. Racial incidents
were reported on the University of Wisconsin campuses and in
communities large and small.
In October 1987, a Wisconsin Democratic state representative
introduced a penalty enhancement bill, explaining that "there has
been an alarming increase in crimes that seem to be motivated by
bigotry-even in progressive Madison."' 9 About five months later,
the bill passed the state assembly by a unanimous vote and the
senate by a vote of twenty-seven to three. Democratic Senator Lynn
Adelman opposed the bill, asserting that it came perilously close to
penalizing thought. Senator Adelman, a practicing attorney, would
later file an amicus brief in the Mitchell case in our court and
appear before the United States Supreme Court arguing that the
law was unconstitutional. 20
17. Abner J. Mikva, How Do We Manage the Right to Hate, 19 J.C. & U.L.
35, 35 (1992).
18. For reports of increasing "hate crimes," see, e.g., Daniel Goleman, As Bias
Crime Seems to Rise, Scientists Study Roots of Racism, N.Y. Timas, May 29,
1990, at C1.
The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith monitors hate crimes motivated by
antisemitism and reported a marked an increase in antisemitic incidents. See, e.g.,
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate Crime Statutes: A 1991 Status Report
(1991); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1992 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents
(1992).
For discussions of the Federal Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, see James B.
Jacobs & Barry Eisler, The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, CsM. L. BULL.,
Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 99; Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime into Focus:
The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 261
(1991).
19. State Representative David E. Clarenbach quoted in the BADGER HERALD,
Oct. 28, 1987.
20. Senator Adelman was characterized by one columnist as "that rarest of
living creatures: a politician willing to stick out his neck for an unpopular cause."
Bill Lueders, The Folly of Outlawing Hate, MILWAUKEE MAG., Aug. 1993, at 102.
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In many other states, hate crime laws were passed with a similar
lack of controversy. Civil rights groups lobbied for the laws. The
rise of hate groups in the 1980s made the legislation seem timely. 21
By 1991, 46 states had enacted some form of hate crime legislation. 22
21. Eugene H. Czajkoski, Criminalizing Hate: An Empirical Assessment, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1992, at 36, 36; Kenneth Jost, Hate Crimes, 3 CONG. Q. RE-
SEARCHER, 1, 12 (Jan. 8, 1993).
22. Kenneth Jost, Hate Crimes, 3 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER, 1, 13 (Jan. 8, 1993);
Marion Z. Goldberg, Statutes Combat Hate Crimes in 46 States, ADL Reports,
TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 88; Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate Crime
Statutes: A 1991 Status Report (1991).
Hate crime statutes take several forms. Some proscribe particular hate conduct
such as damaging places of worship; some increase the penalties for substantive
criminal offenses motivated by hate, either by making the hate motivation a separate
crime or through a penalty enhancement; some make it unlawful to willfully injure,
intimidate, or interfere with enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the
Constitution or laws because of bias; and some provide injunctive relief. For a
discussion of the various legislative efforts, see, e.g.,. Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A
Theoretical & Practical Overview, 4 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 165, 168-69 (1992-
93).
For discussions of state statutes, see, e.g., Abraham Abramovksy, Bias Crime:
A Call for Alternative Responses, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 875, 888-95 (1992)
(discussing New York laws); Edward Comitz, Extinguishing the Burning Crosses:
Washington's Malicious Harassment Statute in Light of the Issues of Overbreadth
and Vagueness, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 373 (1992) (discussing Washington
laws); Eugene H. Czajkoski, Criminalizing Hate: An Empirical Assessment, FED.
PROBATION, Sept. 1992, at 36, 37-40 (discussing Florida laws); Marc L. Fleischauer,
Teeth for a Paper Tiger: A Proposal to Add Enforceability to Florida's Hate
Crimes Act, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 (1990) (discussing Florida laws); Phyllis
B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With Punishing
Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 259 (1992) (discussing Oregon laws);
Virginia N. Lee, Legislative Responses to Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massa-
chusetts Experience and Beyond, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 287 (1990) (discussing
Massachusetts laws); Helen L. Mazur-Hart, Racial and Religious Intimidation: An
Analysis of Oregon's 1981 Law, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 197 (1982) (discussing
Oregon laws).
The St. Paul Ordinance at issue in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992), which the United States Supreme Court struck down, provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object ... or
graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 2541. For discussions of the R.A.V. case, see, e.g., Jonathan D. Selbin,
Bashers Beware: The Continuing Constitutionality of Hate Crimes Statutes After
R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REV. 157 (1993); Joseph E. Starkey, Jr., R.A.V. v. St. Paul:
The Debate over the Constitutionality of Hate Crime Laws Ends; or Is This Just
the Beginning?, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 561 (1992-93); Anthony S. Winer, The R.A.V.
Case and the Distinction Between Hate Speech Laws and Hate Crime Laws, 18
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 971 (1992).
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By 1992, a federal penalty enhancement provision was pending before
Congress.
23
All of the state hate crime statutes protect those victimized on
the basis of race or religion. 24 Some cover additional categories
including national origin, sex or gender, sexual orientation, disability,
and age. 25 And apparently other groups are also seeking protection.
After violent physical attacks on lawyers in California this year, 26
California State Bar president Harvey Saferstein urged that crimes
motivated by hatred of lawyers should be classed as hate crimes
and subject to additional punishment. 27 I would not want to put
this issue to a vote.
About one-half of the hate crime statutes contain sentence
enhancement provisions, similar to the statute involved in the Mitchell
case. Arkansas took a slightly different tack. In 1993, the Arkansas
legislature furnished a civil remedy for bias-motivated conduct. An
aggrieved party may be entitled to damages, including punitive dam-
ages, injunctive relief, an award of the costs of litigation, and
reasonable attorney's fees. 28
23. The proposed federal law instructs the Sentencing Commission to establish
guidelines for imposing enhanced penalties on persons committing bias-motivated
crimes. Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 64 (1992); Bias Crimes: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 80
(1992).
24. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 259, 273 (1992).
25. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate Crime Statutes: A 1991 Status
Report 22 (1991) (charting the characteristics included in each state); Phyllis B.
Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!.: The Problems With Punishing Hate
Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 259, 273 (1992); Rorie Sherman, Hate
Crimes Statutes Abound, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3.
26. On July 1, 1993, a former client fired round after round of ammunition
into the San Francisco law office of Pettit & Martin, killing eight and wounding
six before killing himself.
The massacre was, rather hyperbolically, called the ultimate in lawyer-
bashing. But it was only one of a series of murders and assaults on
lawyers. And it came at a time when the public opinion of attorneys had
reached an all-time low .... And the public's poor view of attorneys-
as well as assaults on lawyers by disgruntled clients-seems likely to continue
in the coming years.
Auger Against Lawyer Left Mercy Dead, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27-Jan. 3, 1994, at S5.
27. Saferstein's position was reported in On Slurs ... Weep Not for Lawyers,
L.A. DAILY J., July 15, 1993, at 6 (editorial from the Fresno Bee). The Fresno
Bee agreed with Saferstein that lawyer jokes have become offensive, stupid, and
sometimes ugly, but opposed having hate speech codes augmented to include lawyers.
28. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-104 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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In the Mitchell case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of the penalty enhancement statute. 29 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court, on a vote of five to two, struck it down.30
The majority held that the statute violated the First Amendment
directly by punishing what the legislature deemed to be offensive
thought. The court held further that the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad; the state would be likely to show bigoted motive by
introducing evidence of the defendant's prior speech, thus chilling
expression.
This case is proof positive of the influence of law review articles
on judicial decision-making. The majority opinion relied heavily on
a UCLA Law Review article authored by Susan Gellman,"' an Ohio
public defender who opposed Ohio's hate crime law and represented
defendants charged under hate laws in Ohio and Florida. Her lengthy
article analyzed hate crime laws and found them to be unconsti-
tutional. Although the Gellman article later became the focal point
of scholarly commentary, it stood virtually alone when the Mitchell
case was being considered. It had great influence on both the Wis-
consin and Ohio supreme courts in striking down their states' statutes. 32
Ms. Gellman sat alongside Wisconsin's state Senator Adelman during
the oral argument of the Mitchell case before the United States
Supreme Court.
A majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the
hate crime statute. Two justices dissented, concluding that the penalty
enhancement statute punished conduct, not speech, and therefore
survives a First Amendment challenge. In short, the dissenters argued,
the Constitution allows bigoted thoughts, but it does not allow a
person to act on them. The United States Supreme Court agreed
and on a unanimous vote upheld the statute.
I was one of the Wisconsin dissenters.
I opened my dissent in Mitchell with the following words:
The Constitution teaches mistrust of any government regulation
of speech or expression. Had I been in the legislature, I do not
29. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 485 N.W.2d
807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
30. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), rev'd sub nom. 113 S. Ct.
2194 (1993).
31. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 333 (1991). For a subsequent article, see Susan Gellman,
"Brother, You Can't Go to Jail for What You're Thinking": Motives, Effects,
and "Hate Crime" Laws, CRrM. JusT. ETHIcs, Summer/Fall 1992, at 24.
32. See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992).
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believe I would have supported this statute because I do not
think this statute will accomplish its goal .... As a judge,
however, after much vacillation, I conclude that this law should
be construed narrowly and should be held constitutional. 3
You will note that in launching my dissent I could be accused
of committing not one but two infractions of judicial convention.
First, I reach out and comment upon the wisdom of a law; I insert
my personal views in personal terms. Second, I confess my doubts
and indecision about the constitutionality of the law.3 4
We all know that the role of a judge is not to express personal
opinions about particular statutes. A judge's job is to interpret and
apply statutes, not support or oppose them. In a case like Mitchell,
my role is to determine whether the statute at issue passes consti-
tutional muster. Whether the law is wise social policy is a question
for the public and the legislature. In commenting on the wisdom
of a statute, then, some might say I am guilty of overstepping my
institutional boundaries. How can an appellate judge, removed as
she is from the political arena, suggest that the legislature has enacted
a bad law?
By the time the Mitchell case reached the state supreme court,
the wisdom of hate crime laws was being questioned. The debate
continues. A Nexis search revealed 755 stories nationwide about hate
speech since 1991. In the same time period, Nexis stopped counting
at 1000 in a search for the topic "hate crime." Those who support
hate crime laws argue that they deter hate motivated behavior; that
they reinforce the community belief in the injustice of hate; that
they reassure hate victims of their value as members of our polity.
Most important, proponents say, punishment for hate crimes sym-
bolically heals the wounds in the social fabric that are created by
hate-motivated acts 5
33. 485 N.W.2d 807, 818 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
34. Professor David Shapiro defends judicial candor, writing that "wide respect
[is] accorded to those twentieth-century judges whose opinions are especially notable
for their candid recognition of the difficulties of decision and the strength of
competing arguments." David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100
HARv. L. REv. 731, 740 (1987). For "a harmonious counterpoint to Professor
Shapiro," see Charles Fried, Imprudence, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 155.
Lawrence Solan asserts that the principle of neutrality exerts "a force on judges
that increases the temptation to report the reasons behind their decisions less than
fully and openly." LAWRENCE M. SoLAN, THE LAN UAGE OF JUDGES 2-3 (1993).
35. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEIAV. Sci. & L. 259, 266-68 (1992);
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Those like Wisconsin Senator Adelman, who oppose hate crime
statutes, believe them to be unnecessary and downright pernicious.
3 6
The conduct punished is already illegal. Although it may be strongly
counter-intuitive, social science theories suggest that hate crime sta-
tutes may actually increase bigotry at the level of the individual
offender and in the community as a whole." Many persons also
fear that hate crime laws will ultimately be used against the very
groups they are designed to protect, and this case illustrates that
phenomenon.3" It appears that hate crime statutes may be dispro-
Kenneth Jost, Hate Crimes, 3 CoNG. Q. RESEARCHER 1, 7 (Jan. 8, 1993); Nadine
Strossen, Hate Crimes: Should They Carry Enhanced Penalties?, A.B.A. J., May
1993, at 44; Brian S. Westenberg, Michigan's Ethnic Intimidation Act: The Short-
comings of the Law's Moral Imperative, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1127, 1155-58 (1992);
Henry L. Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil
Rights, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37.
Social scientists have not provided empirical evidence that the deterrent, edu-
cational, retributive, and symbolic purposes of hate crime laws are realized.
36. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 259, 280-82 (1992); Nat
Hentoff, Hate Crimes: Should They Carry Enhanced Penalties?, A.B.A. J., May
1993, at 44, 45; James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A
New York City Perspective, CRUM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 55, 59-60;
Kenneth Jost, Hate Crimes, 3 CONG. Q. RESEARCHER 1, 5-7 (Jan. 8, 1993); Diana
M. Torres, Bias Crime Legislation: A Constitutional Rebuttal to Sticks and Stones
... 26 AKRON L. REV. 99, 106-07 (1992); Brian S. Westenberg, Michigan's Ethnic
Intimidation Act: The Shortcomings of the Law's Moral Imperative, 4 DET. C.L.
REV. 1127, 1158-60 (1992); Comment, Bad Motives, THE NEW YORKER, June 21,
1993, at 4, 5.
37. Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, Smile When You Call Me That!: The Problems With
Punishing Hate Motivated Behavior, 10 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 259, 280-82 (1992).
A further danger of hate crime laws, opponents say, is that they distract us
from taking action that would be more than merely symbolic; they present the
illusion that society is responding to bias-motivated violence when it is not. Susan
Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your
Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 333, 389 (1991).
A New Yorker article concludes that hate crime laws tempt politicians with the
promise of something for nothing-meaningful benefits at no cost. The promise
is deceptive on both counts: there are no benefits, apart from some fleeting good
feelings, and it is alarming that what people think becomes an object of the
attention of the criminal justice system. Comment, Bad Motives, THE NEW YORKER,
June 21, 1993, at 4, 5.
Professor James Weinstein contends that enhancing punishment "is part of a
larger American syndrome of adopting harsh punishment as an expedient response
that deals only with the most superficial manifestations of complex, deep-seated
problems." James B. Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Leg-
islation: Where's the Speech?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 6, 16.
38. James B. Jacobs, Rethinking the War Against Hate Crimes: A New York
City Perspective, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 55, 60.
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portionately enforced against minority group members such as Todd
Mitchell .9
With such shaip disagreement on the wisdom of hate crime
laws, why do I as a judge stray across my institutional boundaries?
After all, judges cannot declare void those laws with which we
disagree or to which we are opposed. Our personal views of the
soundness of legislation are, in fact, irrelevant. And in the Mitchell
case, articulating my personal views was certainly avoidable. Indeed,
I argue vigorously in my dissent that the Wisconsin statute should
be saved, not struck down. Why then do I begin the dissent by
calling the statute unwise?
This brings me to my second infraction of judicial convention:
the reference to my personal indecision and doubts about the con-
stitutionality of the statute.4' Constitutionality is a difficult question
because the lines between speech, expressive conduct, and nonex-
pressive conduct are fuzzy in First Amendment analysis. Burning a
flag is protected speech, while burning a draft card is unprotected
conduct. 41
My personal views as expressed in the dissent take two forms-
the "had I been in the legislature'i refrain, and my confession that
39. Comment, Bad Motives, THE NEW YORKER, June 21, 1993, at 4, 5.
40. Lawrence Solan writes as follows:
[B]ecause judges wield such enormous power, there is pressure on them
to speak decisively. It would be very difficult for an appellate judge to
say, 'I hereby affirm your death sentence, although this was a very close
question. ... ' Any lawyer who has been on the losing side of a close
question will recall the shock of reading how easily the judge rejects the
losing arguments out of hand, as if they could not have been made by
a thinking person. The pressure to speak with a definitive voice works as
a wedge, driving apart decision making on the one hand and presentation
on the other. Rarely do Judges, in their written opinions, discuss the degree
of difficulty of the decision.
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 2 (1993).
41. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968).
In other countries different analyses prevail. See, e.g., John Gibson and David
Allen, The Issue of Racial Vilification, LAW INST. J., Aug. 1990, at 709 (Australia);
Arthur Fish, Hate Promotion and Freedom of Expression: Truth and Consequences,
2 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 111 (1989) (Canada); Kathleen Mahoney, The
Canadian Constitutional Approach to Freedom of Expression in Hate Propaganda
and Pornography, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (1992) (Canada); Evelyn Kallen,
Never Again: Target Group Responses to the Debate Concerning Anti-Hate Prop-
aganda Legislation, 11 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 46 (1991) (Canada); David
Partlett, From Red Lion Square to Skokie to the Fatal Shore: Racial Defamation
and Freedom of Speech, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431 (1989) (Australia);
Colloquium, Language as Violence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and Amer-
ican Perspectives on Group Defamation, 37 BUrr. L. REV. 337 (1989).
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as a judge I vacillated about the statute's validity. These personal
comments stand apart-textually and analytically-from the judicial
reasoning that makes up the rest of the dissenting opinion. And
like my comment on the wisdom of the statute, my confession about
my vacillation seems at odds with what follows. Indeed, if you read
the rest of my dissent-and I encourage you to do so-you will be
hard put to find even a hint of vacillation. I proclaim with assurance
that the statute punishes acts, not beliefs. I argue with confidence
that "Itihe statute does nothing more than assign consequences to
invidiously discriminatory acts." And I maintain-again, without
hesitation-that "[tihe only chilling effect" [of the statute] is not
on speech but on "lawless conduct." 42
So why do I begin the dissent by calling the statute unwise?
And why do I draw attention to my personal vacillation? These
questions can be stated more generally: Why do judges sometimes
feel compelled to provide personal commentary about the cases they
decide?
I would like to explore with you today some of the reasons a
judge may choose to insert her personal views in a legal opinion,
and some of the consequences of such an action.4 3 Now, let us be
42. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 819 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme
Court in a brief unanimous opinion made short shrift of all arguments of facial
invalidity. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 124 L. Ed. 2d 436 (1993). For
a discussion of the issues involved in Mitchell and a critique of the United States
Supreme Court's decision, see James Weinstein, Hate Crime and Punishment: A
Comment on Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 73 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
43. Judge Cardozo understood the opinion as a form of cogent writing. "The
opinion will need persuasive force, or the impressive virtue of sincerity and fire,
or the mnemonic power of alliteration and antithesis, or the terseness and tang of
the proverb and the maxim. Neglect the help of these allies, and it may never win
its way." BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 9 (1931).
For analyses of judicial strategies to persuade the numerous audiences of judicial
decisions, see HAIG BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAl. OPINIONS (1992);
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION CH. 6
(1988); David E. Anderson, Reflections on the Supreme Court, Constitutionalism,
and the Rhetoric of Law, 8 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 75 (1989); J.G. Deutsch
& M.H. Hoeflich, Legal Duty and Judicial Style: The Meaning of Precedent, 25
ST. Louis U. L.J. 87 (1981); Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style,
36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 915 (1961); Marc E. Gold, The Mask of Objectivity: Politics
and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada, 7 Sup. CT. L. REV. 455 (1985);
Robert A.. Prentice, Supreme Court Rhetoric, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 85 (1983); Gerald
B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545,
1560-66 (1990); Ron Moss, Rhetorical Stratagems in Judicial Opinions, 2 SCRIBES
J. LEGAL WRITING 103 (1991).
For analyses of the literary qualities of the writings of selected judges and
cases, see Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric
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clear. Judges tell us what they think with regularity. A dissenting
judge may tell her colleagues: "I believe X is the case"; "I believe
the majority errs"; "I believe the constitution requires Y result";
"I think the standard of review should be Z"; "I think it unwise
for the court to do Q." It is common for judges to speak their
minds in these standard phrases. What is less common, I would
suggest, is for a judge to speak in the first person about what is
in her heart. While the state and federal reporters contain examples
of judges stating in unmistakable terms their personal views about
the matter at hand, when you look at the totality of cases, and the
opinions authored by an individual judge, personal beliefs are rarely
made known in the context of legal argument.
As we begin to consider how, when, and why a judge decides
to express personal views publicly, I would turn your attention to
the anguished words of Justice Kennedy's concurrence in the flag
desecration case, Texas v. Johnson. The United States Supreme Court
overturned Johnson's conviction for burning the American flag.
Johnson's act was held to be expressive conduct permitting him to
invoke the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy concurred, writing:
[T]his case, like others before us from time to time, exacts its
personal toll. . . . The case before us illustrates better than most
that the judicial power is often difficult in its exercise .... The
hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not
like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense
that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except
in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the
result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that
dictates the decision. This is one of those rare cases. 4
in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833 (1986); L.H. LaRue,
The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43 (1981); Raymond
S. Rodgers, Generic Tendencies in Majority and Non-Majority Supreme Court
Opinions: The Case of Justice Douglas, 30 COMM. Q. 232 (1982); Kenneth L.
Schneyer, Talking about Judges, Talking about Women: Constitutive Rhetoric in
the Johnson Controls Case, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 117 (1993); Daniel G. Stroup, Law
and Language: Cardozo's Jurisprudence and Wittgenstein's Philosophy, 18 VAL.
U. L. REV. 331 (1984); Richard H. Weisberg, Law, Literature and Cardozo's
Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1979); Jan Deutsch, A Comment on
"The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke," 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63 (1981); James
B. White, A Response to "The Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke," 38 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 73 (1981).
44. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548, 105 L.
Ed. 2d 342, 364 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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What might Justice Kennedy have been doing with these words?
Why would a judge want to share in print his private anxiety or
personal anguish? Perhaps it was Justice Kennedy's way of coming
to terms with his position as a judge sworn to uphold the law, and
as a person with deeply patriotic feelings about his flag and country.
In expressing personal beliefs, a judge may be making peace
with himself. Acknowledging his personal beliefs before applying
the law in a way that contradicts those same beliefs may do less
damage to those beliefs and to his sense of self. The disclosure
reassures him that his moral sense remains intact, that his values
have not been defeated by the demands of the bench. Perhaps when
I drafted my dissent in Mitchell I was speaking to myself in this
way.
What else might Justice Kennedy have been doing with his
emotional appeal? Perhaps he was appropriating the pain and suf-
fering of the public. He was thus making peace with the public and
allowing the public to be at peace with itself. You will recall that
in the flag burning case4' the justices were presented with a challenge
to the constitutionality of a Texas statute criminalizing the desecration
of the American flag. Public opinion strongly favored the Texas
statute, but, by a vote of 5-4, the Court invalidated the statute.4
In giving voice to his own anguish, perhaps Justice Kennedy was
telling the public, "I share your beliefs, but on the bench I'm not
allowed to act on my personal feelings. Please respect that I have
a job to do." This is a natural response when one's actions fly in
the face of one's own personal feeling or a strong public sentiment. 47
45. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989).
46. Justice Brennan, in striking down Johnson's conviction for burning the
American flag in protest of the policies of the Reagan administration, said:
[T]he flag's deservedly cherished place in our community will be strength-
ened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation
of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects....
Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the one immortalized in
our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at Fort
McHenry. It is the Nation's resilience . . .that we reassert today .... We
do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419-20, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 363-64.
47. For an oft-quoted statement of the divergence of the personal and thejudicial view, see Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943). The Court struck down a
state statute requiring school children to salute the flag. Justice Frankfurter dissented,
saying:
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history
is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.
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In Mitchell, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was dealing with a
similarly volatile issue. Although the statute had passed the state
legislature overwhelmingly, debate raged about the wisdom and con-
stitutionality of hate crime laws. Those who believe these laws violate
the right to free speech are passionate, thoughtful individuals who
fear the First Amendment is in jeopardy. As a private citizen, I
share their concerns. But as a judge I am compelled to consider
whether the First Amendment does prohibit the enhancement of
criminal penalties for hate crimes. Perhaps in articulating my personal
views about the statute, even as I argued forcefully for the law's
constitutionality, I was reaching out to say that I considered the
views of those committed individuals who believed otherwise. 48
Why else might Justice Kennedy have voiced his anguish? Per-
haps to affirm, with added vigor, .his and the Court's "commitment
to the process." In expressing distaste for the result, he allows the
reader to disagree with the Court's holding, but not to question the
Court's commitment to the rule of law. After all, he tells us, that
commitment has been tested through the justices' personal suffering
in reaching a result they find distasteful.
Thus Kennedy's words, personal and emotional though they may
sound, can be seen from another perspective: they suggest their
counterpoints, the impersonal and the dispassionate. While pur-
Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate
myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing
as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are
neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic .... As a member
of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy
into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may-cherish them or how
mischievous I may deem their disregard.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646-47, 63 S. Ct. at 1189, 87 L. Ed. at 1642 (Frankfurter,
I disent in ,
48. Professor James Boyd White describes the judge working her way through
her own attitudes and confronting the arguments of each side as follows:
The ideal would be a judge who puts his (or her) fundamental attitudes
and methods to the test of sincere engagement with arguments the other
way. We could ask, does this judge see the case before him as the occasion
for printing out an ideology, for displaying technical skill, or as presenting
a real difficulty, calling for real thought? The ideal judge would show
that he had listened to the side he voted against and that he had felt the
pull of the arguments both ways. The law that was made that way would
compromise two opposing voices, those of the parties, in a work made
by another, by the judge who had listened to both and had faced the
conflict between them in an honest way. In this sense the judge's most
important work is the definition of his own voice, the character he makes
for himself as he works through a case.
JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 47 (1985).
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porting to expose the heart-felt sentiments of the justice, they tell
the reader that the justice is putting passion aside. Just as the process
of identifying and articulating passion enables the justice to reach
a dispassionate result, it prompts readers to follow the same path-
to recognize their own passions so that they, too, can put them
aside. In that way, the justice hopes to persuade the opinion's many
audiences-the litigants, lawyers, judges, scholars, law students, jour-
nalists, and the public-of the rightness of the result despite their
initial gut reaction that the result is wrong. If the justice has endured
personal pain so that the "right result" can be reached, the reader
also must tolerate the pain and accept the outcome.
Such an appeal to emotions has an ironic effect. When a judge
moves from personal statement to legal argument, the law rises
above the fray of passions. The detachment of the legal analysis is
enhanced. The legal conclusion appears more reasonable, more au-
thoritative, precisely because the judge has wrestled with, and over-
come, the personal passions. The overall effect is a heightened sense
of objectivity that befits the weighty task at hand.4 9
Though I had no such intention, I suppose my words in Mitchell
had a similar effect. By characterizing the hate crime statute as
unwise, but proceeding to argue that it is constitutional, I distin-
guished the court from the legislature and reaffirmed their respective
roles. By confessing my vacillation over the outcome of the case,
but proceeding to argue that the statute should be construed narrowly
and held constitutional, I made a special case for the constitutionality
of this statute.
But I am perhaps giving myself, Justice Kennedy, and the
judiciary in general more credit than we deserve. I recently asked
a young lawyer why judges sometimes bare their souls in opinions.
He thought for a moment, shrugged his shoulders, and responded
that "the law clerks probably slip it in when the judge isn't looking."
This attorney obviously does not hold judges in high regard, and
clearly he has not clerked in my chambers.
His impertinence or joshing aside, this young attorney was
expressing the cynicism often voiced on law school campuses around
the country. I am sure Little Rock is no exception. The cynics
question judges who profess to be following the law regardless of
personal inclination. The law does not move along some clearly
defined course, they argue; it all depends on who is navigating. So,
49. For a discussion of the importance of disinterestedness to legitimate thejudicial role, see M.H. Hoeflich & Jan G. Deutsch, Judicial Legitimacy and the
Disinterested Judge, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749 (1978).
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according to the cynics, when we judges painstakingly chart our
course in terms of formal legal reasoning, we do so because we are
unwilling to acknowledge that we do nothing more than navigate
according to our own polestars.
Scholars often criticize the notion that the law forces judges to
forsake their deeply held beliefs of what is right and wrong. The
law is not rigid. An issue can be stated in many ways and the way
the issue is phrased often determines the answer. It is rare, they
say, that a judge is unable to invoke a strand of law, no matter
how slender, to support what the judge believes is the better result.
When a judge claims that her hands are tied and the result mandated,
the judge is using what one law clerk I know calls the "wimp
rationale." 50 Robert Cover, in his famous book Justice Accused,
calls it "The Judicial Can't."'"
Call me a victim of false consciousness if you wish, but I believe
that most judges embark on an honest search for what the Con-
stitution means, for what the precedents dictate, and for what the
legislature intended. Judges feel constrained by our oath to decide
cases according to the law even though we are sometimes unhappy
with the results imposed upon litigants. Decisions not supported by
strong arguments are more likely to expose us to reversal by a higher
court. Poor decisions attract valid criticism by scholars, law reviews,
legislators, and the media.
Whether you believe that judges are constrained is perhaps not
as important as the fact that the judges I know perceive themselves
as subject to constraints. Indeed the perception that curbs exist may
be the most powerful factor constraining the individual judge.52
Nevertheless, judges acknowledge that the scholars' point about
the elasticity of the law has validity and that judges do have choices
in deciding some cases. When judges analyze the range of cases
before them; they estimate that in only about 5-10% of cases are
50. One commentator refers to this judicial plea as "the profession of help-
lessness" or the rhetoric of judicial helplessness. Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1510 (1991); see
also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 199 (1975).
51. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 119-23 (1975). Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., was once asked what he did when the law seemed to suggest one
answer and justice another. Thinking for a moment, he responded, "I don't recall
ever having such a case." Seminar, Georgetown University Law Center (Fall, 1993).
Quoted with permission.
52. For a discussion of the restraints judges feel, see Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Judging in the Quiet of the Storm, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 965 (1993).
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the competing arguments and precedents equally strong. To decide
these cases, judges must exercise a measure of discretion."
In such difficult cases, judges are critical-especially in dissent-
of majority opinions that purport to be "the dispassionate oracle
of the law." To the judge who perceives the complexity of a case,
the certainty of her colleagues may appear but a pretense. Perhaps
to throw their sterile formalism into sharp relief, she might focus
a dissent on the facts and appeal to the readers' emotions by arguing
that if the result contravenes good common sense, it must be wrong.
This second form of judicial argument from the heart is reminiscent
of Justice Holmes's famous aphorism: "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 5 4
It was to our human experience that Justice Blackmun appealed
in his passionate dissent in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services." He asserted that the question presented
was open, not closed as the majority declared, and that the precedents
could be read narrowly or broadly depending on how one chose to
read them. In DeShaney a child-Joshua-was beaten by his father
to the point of severe permanent brain damage. The mother brought
a civil rights action on the child's behalf against Wisconsin social
workers and local officials for failing to remove him from his father's
custody even after they had become aware of the abusive treatment.
53. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 60 (1924);
Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 857; Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a
Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222 (1961); Richard A. Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MIc H. L. REV. 827, 827-28 (1988).
Furthermore, the elasticity probably increases with the level of the court. The
state and the federal supreme courts have more room to interpret the law and
change its direction than do trial courts or intermediate courts of appeal.
54. Justice Holmes stated:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining' the rules by which men should be governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
For discussions of the roles of reason and human values in decision making,
see William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law,"
42 REC. Ass'N B. CITY OF N.Y. 948 (1987); A. Morgan Cloud III, Introduction:
Compassion and Judging, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 13 (1980); Judith S. Kaye, The Human
Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1988); Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion
for Justice, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 37 (1988).
55. 489 U.S. 189, 212-13, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1012-13, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 269-
70 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The majority held that a state had no constitutional duty to protect
the child against his father's violence. The Due Process clause, said
the majority, ordinarily confers no affirmative right to government
aid, even when necessary to secure life. Even though "[j]udges and
lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in a
case like this to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive
adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them,"
wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist, he and the majority would not rec-
ognize Joshua's cause of action.16
Justice Blackmun eschewed the majority's formalistic, syllogistic
reasoning and called for a sympathetic reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an ir-
responsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and aban-
doned by [officials] who placed him in a dangerous predicament
and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet essentially
did nothing, except, as the Court revealingly observes . . . 'dutifully
recorded these incidents in [their] files'." ' 57 Blackmun's words sting.
"Poor Joshua!" The words leave the reader ashamed, as if complicit
in delivering the blows and in withholding aid to Joshua..8
Justice Brennan also dissented in DeShaney, but in a very
different style. Justice Brennan relied on legal authority-case ci-
tations and historical analysis.5 9 Justice Blackmun joined in Justice
Brennan's dissent but also wrote separately. Why wasn't Brennan's
legal analysis enough? In DeShaney the majority opinion was based
on the formalistic distinction between action and inaction. Justice
Blackmun's stress on the facts and his expression of outrage illustrate
the superficiality of the majority's reliance on an abstract legal
principle, while striking a moral blow. His rhetorical device strength-
ened Brennan's more traditional analysis and showed how far re-
56. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249,
263.
57. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213, 109 S. Ct. at 1012, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 270
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Justice Blackmun elaborated as follows:
It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles-
so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about 'liberty
and justice for all,' that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to
live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his
mother, as petitioners here, deserve-but now are denied by this Court-
the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light of
the constitutional protection that 42 U.S.C. 1983 is meant to provide.
Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 213, 109 S. Ct. at 1012-13, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 170 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
59. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203-12, 109 S. Ct. at 1007-12, 103 L. Ed. 2d at
264-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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moved was the majority's rarified discussion from life and death
realities in Joshua's home town of Neenah, Wisconsin, 60
Justice Blackmun portrayed the DeShaney majority and dis-
senting opinions as presenting the age-old conflict between legal
formalism and conscience. To whisk you back to your American
literature classes, it was this clash between the formal and the moral
that Herman Melville explored in his masterwork Billy Budd. As
you may recall, Billy Budd is an angelic innocent charged with
fomenting mutiny and killing a fellow sailor aboard the Belliponte.
The ship's captain, Vere, considers Billy's moral innocence, but
concludes that he is bound by his imperial duty to enforce the
Mutiny Act. Consequently, Billy Budd hangs.61
Melville's father-in-law was Lemuel Shaw, the antebellum Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Chief Justice
Shaw was an ardent abolitionist who "came down hard for an
unflinching application of the harsh and summary" Fugitive Slave
Act. 62 The late Professor Robert Cover suggests in his history of
slavery and the judicial process that Melville had Chief Justice Shaw
in mind when he created Captain Vere, who pleaded helplessness
before the law. 63
The judges of Melville's era grappled in the slave cases with
the "moral-formal dilemma," "the demands of role and the voice
60. For a critical analysis of the rhetoric of Justice Blackmun's dissent and its
reasoning as a "jurisprudence of compassion," see Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney
and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1101 (1990).
61. For analyses of Billy Budd, see, e.g., William Domnarski, Law-Literature
Criticism: Charting a Desirable Course with Billy Budd, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 702
(1984); Christopher J. Sterritt, Ode to "Billy Budd": Judicial Professionalism in
Modern American Military Justice, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 208 (1991); Richard
Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor
with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1982); Symposium,
Billy Budd, Sailor, 1 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 1 (1989).
62. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 4-5 (1975).
63. Indeed, Justice Blackmun refers to Professor Cover's book, saying:
[Flormalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and
stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I submit that these
Clauses were designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal
reasoning that infected antebellum jurisprudence, which the late Professor
Robert Cover analyzed so effectively in his significant work entitled Justice
Accused (1975).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212, 109 S. Ct. at 1012, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 270 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun analogizes the majority who claim that their decision, "however
harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine" to the "antebellum judges who
denied relief to fugitive slaves." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212, 109 S. Ct. at 1012,
103 L. Ed. 2d at 270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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of conscience." 4 It should come as no surprise that modern judges
are likewise struggling with the conflict between legal formalism and
conscience in capital punishment cases. The stakes are high, the
issues complex, the time for decision often short. For example, Judge
Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit objected strenuously to the perception that some Ninth
Circuit judges are "vigilante judges who oppose capital punishment
and follow their personal predilections instead of the law. .... "63
Judge Reinhardt objected to this characterization, writing:
Nothing could be further from the truth. In capital cases no less
than in other cases, the judges of this court act not on the basis
of their personal views but on the basis of their understanding
of their oath of office and of the requirements of due process
of law. . . . [A]l1 of the members of this court will follow the
clearly expressed directives of the Supreme Court, no matter how
offensive they may be to the sensibilities or constitutional un-
derstandings of individual judges."6
Let us examine one judge's writing in two death penalty cases.
The first case is Maxwell v. Bishop,67 the second McCleskey v.
Kemp."
In 1962, William Maxwell, an African American, was convicted
of raping Stella Spoon, a Caucasian, in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
Sentenced to death by the trial court of Garland County, Maxwell
appealed. 69 On direct appeal and in his two subsequent petitions for
federal habeas corpus relief, Maxwell challenged the constitutionality
of Arkansas's rape statute. Among the arguments he advanced was
the contention that the statute was discriminatorily enforced against
African Americans and in favor of whites. Specifically, Maxwell
argued that Arkansas juries customarily applied the state's rape
statute in a racially discriminatory and unconstitutional manner, such
that a disproportionate number of African American males convicted
of raping white women received the death penalty. At three separate
hearings in three separate courts Maxwell presented increasingly
64. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 6-7 (1975).
65. Brewer v. Lewis, 997 F.2d 550, 563 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S. Ct. 1578, 26
L. Ed. 2d 221 (1970) (case vacated on other grounds).
68. 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987).
69. The Supreme Court later held that the sentence of death for the crime of
rape violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977).
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sophisticated statistical evidence in support of his equal protection
claim. 70
The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Maxwell's argument on
direct appeal. 7 Federal district judges rejected both of Maxwell's
petitions for habeas corpus, 72 as did the panels of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 7 The courts found the
statistical evidence presented by Maxwell incomplete, not directly
relevant to his individual claim, and statistically insufficient. 74
In denying Maxwell's second habeas corpus petition, the Eighth
Circuit had this to say about Maxwell's evidence:
Whatever value [the statistical] argument may have as an instru-
ment of social concern, whatever suspicion it may arouse with
respect to southern interracial rape trials as a group over a long
period of time, and whatever it may disclose with respect to other
localities, we feel that the statistical argument does nothing to
destroy the integrity of Maxwell's trial. 7"
The Court's words are authoritative in tone and final in their
implication. But at the very end of the three judge opinion the
following statement appears:
[TJhe fact that it is the death penalty, rather than life impris-
onment . . . makes the decisional process in a case of this kind
particularly excruciating for the author of this opinion who is
not personally convinced of the rightness of capital punishment
and who questions it as an effective deterrent. But the advisability
of capital punishment is a policy matter ordinarily to be resolved
70. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710, 717-21 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Maxwell
v. Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205, 216-17 (E.D. Ark. 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 325 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965); Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694,
699-701, 370 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (1963). The Supreme Court of Arkansas framed
the issue thus: Was the Arkansas penalty statute for rape "unconstitutional [in its
application to African Americans] for the reason that in Arkansas it is the practice
and custom of juries to impose the death penalty upon Negro men who rape white
women, without inflicting the same punishment upon other offenders." Maxwell,
236 Ark. at 701, 370 S.W.2d at 117.
71. Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 699-701, 370 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (1963).
72. See Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Ark. 1966); Maxwell v.
Stephens, 229 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Ark. 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 944 (1965).
73. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F.2d 325, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 944 (1965); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 147-48 (8th Cir. 1968),
vacated, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S. Ct. 1578, 26 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1970) (case vacated on
other grounds).
74. "We are not certain that, for Maxwell, statistics will ever be his redemption."
Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 148.
75. Id. at 147.
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by the legislature or through executive clemency and not by the
judiciary.76
That's quite a confession. The decisional process, exclaims the judge,
is not merely painful-it is excruciating. And the judge does not
merely express distaste for the result reached through the law-he
comes close to condemning an entire area of law, the jurisprudence
of capital punishment. The judge's personal outpouring is all the
more noteworthy for the footnote that is included in the disclosure:
The footnote states that the other two judges on the appellate panel
"do not join in this comment." ' 77 This express disavowal isolates
the author from his brethren; he stands alone in the confession of
conscience.
What drove this judge to speak what was in his heart? Was it
that Maxwell's life was in the court's hands? Perhaps, but that is
not a complete answer, for federal courts frequently decide habeas
corpus petitions from death row. Instead, I would suggest that the
discomfort arose because Maxwell's statistical evidence was chal-
lenging the core of the legal system. It was saying that there was
no equal justice under law. Although this judge respected the legal
proof upon which Maxwell was convicted, he was unable to dismiss
Maxwell's charge of race discrimination from his consciousness. No
wonder the judge was moved to express publicly the pain of drafting
the opinion that brought Maxwell one step closer to execution.
In Maxwell the judge echoed Captain Vere as he resolutely
condemned Billy Budd to the hangman's noose. Like Massachusetts's
Lemuel Shaw, the judge wrestled with his principles as he tried to
reach conclusions based in law. The other two judges on the Eighth
Circuit panel expressly turned away from the voice of their colleague's
conscience. Whether the judge's brethren in the Maxwell case merely
disapproved of the injection of personal views in the majority opinion
nr fundamentally disare.d with the qentiment., we will never know.
Eighteen years later, the judge who penned those words in
Maxwell sat on the United States Supreme Court as another con-
demned man presented a hauntingly similar set of facts. The judge,
Justice Blackmun, listened to Warren McCleskey's statistical evidence
purporting to demonstrate a disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty based on the race of the murder victim."
76. Id. at 153-54 (footnote omitted).
77. Id. at 154 n.ll.
78. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262
(1987). McCleskey proffered what the majority characterized as "two sophisticated
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Dividing 5-4, the Court rejected McCleskey's position for reasons
similar to those Judge Blackmun had expressed in Maxwell. This
time, however, Justice Blackmun dissented. As he explained,
McCleskey's statistical evidence was stronger than Maxwell's. 79 Justice
Blackmun proceeded to write, however, that "[d]isparate enforcement
of criminal sanctions 'destroys the appearance of justice and thereby
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.' "80 He challenged
the majority's fear that if McCleskey's claim were taken to its logical
conclusion, it would lead to further constitutional challenges and
would throw into serious question the principles underlying our entire
criminal justice system. If granting relief to McCleskey "were to
lead to a closer examination of the effects of racial considerations
throughout the criminal justice system, the system, and hence society,
might benefit. '"8"
Any judge who voices personal views risks the reprobation of
his colleagues. In making a personal statement a judge exposes
himself to criticism of the type leveled by Justice Scalia at the
statistical studies" examining over 2,000 murder cases in Georgia during the 1970s,
but the majority held that the studies were not sufficient to support the claim that
the Georgia capital punishment statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment.
79. Id. at 354 n.7, 107 S. Ct. at 1799 n.7, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 318 n.7 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 346, 107 S. Ct. at 1795, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 313 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 365, 107 S. Ct. at 1805, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 325.
Justice Blackmun's views on the constitutionality of capital punishment came
full circle after this speech was delivered in November, 1993. He dissented from
the denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994), stating:
I have explained at length on numerous occasions that my willingness to
enforce the capital punishment statutes enacted by the States and the
Federal Government, 'notwithstanding my own deep moral reservations
... has always rested on an understanding that certain procedural safe-
guards ... would ensure that death sentences are fairly imposed.' ...
Because I no longer can state with any confidence that this Court is able
to reconcile the Eighth Amendment's competing constitutional commands,
or that the federal judiciary will provide meaningful oversight to the state
courts as they exercise their authority to inflict the penalty of death, I
believe that the death penalty, as currently administered, is unconstitu-
tional .... I am more optimistic, though, that this Court eventually will
conclude that the effort to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness
'in the infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and
the death penalty-must be abandoned altogether.' Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 442, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1772, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 415 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). I may not live to see that
day, but I have faith that eventually it will arrive. The path the'Court
has chosen lessens us all.
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1137-38 (italics omitted).
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dissenters in Herrera v. Collins, another death penalty case.8 2 Justice
Scalia concluded that the dissenters were "apply[ing] nothing but
their personal opinions" and urged the dissenters to "doubt the
calibration of their consciences ... "I' when the dissent opined that
"[n]othing could be ... more shocking to the conscience . .. than
to execute a person who is actually innocent."' ' Such attacks can
be leveled, fairly or unfairly, whenever a judge reveals, or is char-
acterized as revealing, personal views.
Not surprisingly, judges are selective in their use of personal
disclosures and emotional appeals in their opinions. Sometimes the
emotional appeal is nothing more than a rhetorical device, employed
sparingly to preserve its power. Or it may serve as a blunt instrument
of argument, wielded only when a sharper approach eludes the writer.
But I suspect that there is more to it. Argument of this type diverges
too much from the reasoned, cerebral decision-making of our Anglo-
American legal tradition to be used without strong emotional mo-
tivation.
For Justice Kennedy, it was a litigant who asserted his right to
burn the American flag to protest government policy. For Justice
82. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 874, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 234 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Justice Scalia wrote:
There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if
that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right to demand
judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought
forward after conviction. In saying that such a right exists, the dissenters
apply nothing but their personal opinions to invalidate the rules of more
than two thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
for which this Court itself is responsible. If the system that has been in
place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 'shocks' the dissenters'
consciences, ... perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their con-
sciences, or, better still, the usefulness of :conscience-shocking' as a legal
test.
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874-75, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 234 (Scalia, J, concurring).
For another opinion by Justice Scalia accusing a Justice of voting on the basis
of personal views, see Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994), a death penalty
case. Justice Scalia, choosing to respond to Justice Blackmun's dissent on "personal
grounds," concurred specially in the denial of certiorari, stating: The dissent "refers
to 'intellectual, moral and personal' perceptions, but never to the text and tradition
of the Constitution. It is the latter rather than the former that ought to control."
Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1127 (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. "Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency,
see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2600, 91 L. Ed. 2d
335, 344 (1986), or more shocking to the conscience, see Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172, 72 S. Ct. 205, 209, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952), than to execute a person
who is actually innocent." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 876, 122 L. Ed. 2d at 235
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (italics omitted).
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Blackmun, it was the state's failure to help a suffering child. For
me, it was Todd Mitchell. Mitchell asked me to uphold the primacy
of freedom of speech, which I called "the most treasured right in
a free, democratic society." The State of Wisconsin asked me to
appreciate the state's compelling interest in punishing hate crime.
After much vacillation, I decided that a statute I found personally
troubling was permitted by the Constitution. And so, for the first
time in my seventeen years on the bench, I said so-in very personal
terms.8 5
Justice Blackmun was in his late seventies when he revisited the
issue over which he had agonized as a younger judge. That leaves
me roughly another two decades to think about hate crimes. One
thing is certain: the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mitch-
ell is not the last word on the subject. It merely concludes one
chapter in the evolving story of hate speech and the First Amendment.
When I wrote my dissent in Mitchell, expressing my personal
views seemed a little like letting my judicial hair down. Looking
back with some perspective, I can see new dimensions to the decision
to express my personal views in print. Words and sentences from
85. Professor Wetlaufer gives the following examples of judges writing with
passion:
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (in which
the court held flag burning to be protected by the first amendment); Justice
Marshall's dissent in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct.
706, 739 (1989) (in which the majority held an affirmative action plan to
be unconstitutional); Justice Marshall's dissent in Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (same); and Justice Jackson's dissent
in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 242 (1944) (in which the
majority approved the wartime detention of U.S. citizens of Japanese
descent); see also Justice Blackmun's dissent in Webster v. Reproductive
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3067 (1989) (in which the majority upheld the
constitutionality of a statute limiting the availability of abortions); Justice
Blackmun's and Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 199, 214 (1986) (in which the majority held that a state statute
criminalizing sodomy was constitutional); Justice Jackson's majority opin-
ion in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(in which the majority held that a mandatory pledge of allegiance was
unconstitutional); Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (in which the majority held that defendants'
conviction under the Espionage Act did not violate their first amendment
rights); Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552
(1896) (in which the majority approved a state statute requiring racially
segregated railway accommodations); and Justice Harlan's dissent in Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (in which the majority held that
Congress lacked power to prohibit private discrimination in public accom-
modations).
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REv.
1545, 1563 n.47 (1990).
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the conscience play essential roles in the language of the law. The
voice of a judge's conscience can enable us to believe more ardently
in the principle of the law. Yet the judge's passionate words and
emotive sentences can also force us to question the fairness and
humanity underlying our legal system. Whether they serve to exalt
or to challenge the law, words and sentences from the judge's heart
most assuredly serve justice.
